¶1 Appellants, Jack and Paula Lucas, seek review of the trial court's order granting Appellee school district's Motion to Dismiss. The trial court's dismissal of Appellants' action was based upon findings that Appellee was a political subdivision under the Governmental Tort Claims Act (Act), 51 O.S.Supp. 1990 §§ 151 et seq.; that Appellants' claims were grounded upon a breach of warranty theory and that recovery based upon such theory against a political subdivision is precluded under the Act.

¶12 Appellee urges a "strict letter" reading of § 155(25). However, words, phrases and sentences of a statute are not to be construed in an abstract sense, but with due regard to the context, and in a sense which best harmonizes with all other parts of the statute. State v. Tapp, 380 P.2d 260 (Okla. 1963). Warranty, while originating from contract, must in this case be considered as it relates to the tort context in which it is found.

¶1 This is an appeal from an order denying a motion to vacate a judgment. Because the order appealed from is on a form titled "Court Minute", and we have not been furnished with an order of the trial court meeting the form for appealable orders required by the recent statutory changes, we dismiss the appeal as premature.

²⁶ State v. Tapp, Okl., 380 P.2d 260, 264 (1963).

¶0 Petitioner's appeal of his criminal conviction was affirmed by the three respondent judges sitting on an emergency panel of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner filed two applications for extraordinary relief in the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the emergency panel of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

¶9 [905 P.2d 220] This Court possesses the power to review jurisdictional claims lodged against the Court of Criminal Appeals. We have reviewed such claims by certiorari and prohibition to the Court of Criminal Appeals. Carder v. Court of Criminal Appeals, 595 P.2d 416, 420 (Okla. 1978). We have also assumed jurisdiction in prohibition on a request to restrain enforcement of a judgment on a claim that an inferior court was not properly constituted. Rath v. LaFon, 431 P.2d 312 (Okla. 1967). Prohibition may be used to restrain the exercise of official authority when the office does not legally exist. Nichols v. Levy, 151 Okla. 245, 1 P.2d 766 (1931), overruled on other grounds in Dobbs v. Board of County Commissioners, 208 Okla. 514, 257 P.2d 802, 810 (1953). Further, we explained in detail in State ex rel. Rucker v. Tapp, 380 P.2d 260 (Okla. 1963) why the remedy of prohibition, as opposed to quo warranto, was the proper remedy when the question presented was whether the inferior tribunal was legally constituted. Id. 380 P.2d at 267. We thus construe Jackson's petitions as a collateral attack in prohibition that challenges the enforceability of the opinion issued by the Emergency Appellate Division of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

¶0 Appellants, part Osage Indian and daughters of an original Osage Indian allottee, challenged the will of Mae Little Bear, a non-Indian, contesting the devise of 1.25 headright interest to Mae's non-Indian nephews. The trial court approved distribution to the nephews, ruling restrictions on the ability of non-Osage Indians to receive more than a life estate in a headright interest contained in the Osage Tribe of Indians Technical Corrections Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-605, 98 Stat. 3163, did not apply when the devisor was a non-Indian, like Mae, who owned the full beneficial interest in the headright at the time of death. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: Distribution to the nephews was correct. The 1984 Act does not prohibit a non-Indian devisee from receiving more than a life estate when the devisor is also a non-Indian, who owned the full beneficial interest in the headright at the time of death.

¶22 Notwithstanding the above discussion with regard to § 7 we acknowledge that there is one subsection of the 1978 Act that creates the potential for some ambiguity with regard to the applicability of § 7. This is subsection 5(d) of the 1978 Act which provides: "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a), (b), and (c) of [] section [5], disposition of any Osage headright or mineral interest shall be subject to the provisions of section 7 of this Act." Although 5(d) is not expressly limited to dispositions by Osage Indians, in our view, read in context, 5(d) can only be a limitation on dispositions involving headright interest owned by an Osage Indian. The words, phrases and sentences of a statute are to be understood as used, not in any abstract sense. State ex rel. Rucker v. Tapp, 380 P.2d 260, 264 (Okla. 1963). Words used in a part of a statute must be interpreted in light of their context and understood in a sense which best harmonizes with all other parts of the statute. Id. A review of subsections 5(a), (b) and (c) and the legislative history to the 1978 Act show beyond doubt that § 7 was meant to apply only to dispositions by Osage Indians and subsection 5(d) was not intended to alter this limitation as to the scope of § 7.

¶0 Defendants appeal from summary judgment rested on the second of the plaintiff's two alternative pleas for recovery, while plaintiff counter-appeals from denial of its first theory for relief.

³⁰ State v. Tapp, 380 P.2d 260, 265 [Okl. 1964]; Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Corporation Commission, 90 Okl. 84, 216 P. 917, 921 [1923].

¶0 Five county officials were successful in securing judgment directing the county excise board to approve their request for the maximum salary increase authorized by statute for class "A" officers. The excise board appeals.

² State ex rel. Rucker v. Tapp, 380 P.2d 260 (Okl. 1963).

¶0 In a suit permanently to enjoin school district from compelling plaintiffs-students to attend schools in another district after they have continually attended schools for five years in the district sought to be enjoined, plaintiffs prevailed; intervenor-school district appealed.

⁹ A de facto student is one who, upon full and truthful disclosure of information concerning his entitlement to the educational services sought, was accepted, without reservation, as legally qualified for enrollment, although there was then in existence a later-discovered legal infirmity. Cf. Hoskins v. Dickerson, 239 F. 275, 277 [5th Cir. 1917]; Bedingfield v. Louisville First Nat. Bank, 61 S.E. 30, 32 [Ga. App. 1908], quoting from an English case, Parker v. Kett, Holt, K.B. 221, [1558-1774] All E.Rep. 199, 200 [1701]. The de facto student status of the Burdick children provides per se no basis for their continued enrollment as students in Mid-Del schools. It is the doctrine of equitable estoppel that, under the facts in this case, enables them to remain in the district without attaining a de jure status. (See Part III of this opinion). Cf. Hamrick v. George, Okl., 378 P.2d 324, 331 [1963]; Chicago, R.I. & P. Co. v. Carroll, Brough, Etc., 114 Okl. 193, 245 P. 649, 651 [1926]; State v. Tapp, Okl., 380 P.2d 260, 268 [1963].

¶0 Respondent brought civil suit against petitioner seeking damages for petitioner's alleged acts of burning respondent's barn and pointing a firearm at respondent. The trial court rendered partial summary adjudication for respondent on the factual allegations concerning the pointing of the firearm, finding that a conviction in a jury trial of unlawfully pointing a firearm had determined the factual issues. The trial court certified this ruling for interlocutory review and petitioner sought certiorari review from this Court.

⁵ State ex rel. Rucker v. Tapp, 380 P.2d 260 (Okla. 1963).

¶0 Plaintiff/Appellant filed suit against Hubert Richards and his employer, Leonard Salmons, to recover damages for personal injury caused by the intentional tortious acts of defendant, Hubert Richards. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff and against defendant Richards and a directed verdict in favor of defendant Salmons. Defendant Salmons, appellee, was awarded attorney fees and costs. The Court of Appeals reversed the award of attorney fees and costs.

¶13 An award of attorney fees pursuant to 23 O.S.Supp. 1986 § 103 must be within the strict confines of the statute. If any part of the statute requires interpretation, it may be read in context with the other parts of the statute, State ex rel. Rucker v. Tapp, 380 P.2d 260 (Okla. 1963), and in light of the law in effect at the time of enactment. LeKan v. P & L Fire Protection Co., 609 P.2d 1289 (Okla. 1980). When a motion for attorney fees is properly presented pursuant to § 103, the trial court has a statutory duty to determine whether the nonprevailing party asserted a frivolous claim or defense, that is, whether the claim or defense was asserted: 1) in bad faith, 2) not well grounded in fact, 3) unwarranted by existing law, or 4) not in good faith argument for the extension or modification of existing law. Implicit in this judicial duty, is the power to re-examine the record in its entirety to determine whether a claim or defense is within one of these four phrases, without being bound by the findings, conclusions and judgment on the merits.

¶0 1. Antecedent legislative enactments, which have been repealed or superseded, may be resorted to and considered in the construction of amendatory acts in pari materia.
2. Words employed in the original or antecedent act will be presumed to be used in the same sense in the subsequent amendatory enactment.
3. Different legislative enactment, having reference to the same subject and forming a part of the same act, must be construed as a harmonious whole so that effect will be given to each.
4. Subsequent legislation may be considered as an aid in construing prior enactments upon the same subject.
5. Statutes substituting other than a personal service of process must be strictly complied with to give the court jurisdiction.
6. The provisions of 82 O.S.Supp.1955, Sec. 545, declare that an undertaking for the satisfaction of costs may be required by the trial court of any part, be it proponent or protestant of a conservancy district, who appeals to the Supreme Court from an order either refusing to establish or establishing a conservancy district.

¶9 Antecedent legislative enactments, which have been repealed or superseded, may be resorted to and considered in the construction of amendatory acts in pari materia. Searcy v. State, 64 Okl. 257, 167 P. 476, 478; State ex rel. Rucker v. Tapp, Okl., 380 P.2d 260, 265; and Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd ed., Vol. 3, Sec. 5805, p. 81.

¶0 1. Legislative acts should be construed so as to make all parts thereof harmonious, if a reasonable construction can accomplish the result.
2. It will not be assumed that one part of a legislative act will make inoperative or nullify another part of the same act, if a different and more reasonable construction can be applied.
3. Courts, in construing a statute, may with propriety recur to the history of the time when the act was passed; and this is frequently necessary, in order to ascertain the reason as well as the meaning of particular provisions of the act as the history of the times during which a law was enacted tends strongly to disclose the reasons for the act and therefore the evils sought to be remedied. And whenever light can be derived from such sources, the courts will take judicial notice of the facts of contemporaneous history, the prior state of the law, the particular abuse or defect which the act was meant to remedy and will then apply the language of the act to such state of affairs.
4. Enumeration of specific installations not exempt from ad valorem taxation, and the equipment and material used in connection therewith, contained in last provision of 68 O.S.Supp.1965, § 1001(g), cannot be construed as limiting exception from ad valorem taxation, upon payment of gross production tax, of "equipment, machinery, tools, material or property as is actually necessary and being used and in use" in the production of crude oil, mineral oil, natural gas or casinghead gas by secondary recovery under a waterflood project.

¶38 It is elementary that legislative acts are to be construed in such manner as to reconcile the different provisions and render them consistent and harmonious, and give intelligent effect to each. Thus, where parts of a statute reasonably are susceptible of a construction which will give effect to both, without doing violence to either, such construction should be adopted. Bankers Union Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 182 Okl. 103, 77 P.2d 26; Atlantic Refg. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm., Okl., 360 P.2d 826; State ex rel. Rucker v. Tapp, Okl., 380 P.2d 260. In Atlantic, supra, syllabus 4 states:

¶0 1. In the construction of a statute, legislative intent must govern. In arriving at such intent the entire Act must be considered. When the intent of the Legislature can be gathered from the entire statute, words may be modified, altered or supplied to give the statute the force and effect which the Legislature intended.
2. The phrase, time for doing any act to perfect appeals, as employed in 12 O.S.1961 § 667, includes time to prepare, serve and file case-made.
3. In instances where the time (fifteen days) allowed a litigant-legislator or attorney-legislator by statute (Title 12 O.S.1961 § 958) to make and serve case-made or any enlargement thereof granted by the trial court commences during a legislative session and But for the provisions of Title 12 O.S.1961 § 667 would lapse during such session, such provisions of such section 667 serve to toll the running of such time until the adjournment of the session.

¶27 In State ex rel. Rucker v. Tapp, Okl., 380 P.2d 260, 263, we said:

¶0 1. A statute will not be construed by the court when the words used in the statute are plain and unambiguous.
2. Title 10 O.S. 1961, § 71 permits a trial in a bastardy proceeding to be commenced prior to the birth of the child.
Appeal from the County Court of Oklahoma County, Harold C. Theus, Judge.

¶6 The general rules that apply in construing a statute are that the legislative intent must govern, and to arrive at the legislative intent, the entire act must be considered, McSpadden v. Mahoney, Okl., 402 P.2d 656; a construction should be given the act which is reasonable and sensible, Christian v. Shideler, Okl., 382 P.2d 129, and should not be construed so that it would lead to an inconsistency between different parts as they bear upon each other. State ex rel. Rucker v. Tapp, Okl., 380 P.2d 260.

¶0  1. If a Corporation Commissioner voluntarily becomes interested in the stock of a "pipe line company, operated for hire," his office shall become vacant; but to meet the requirement of becoming voluntarily interested, the evidence must be sufficient to sustain a finding that such commissioner knew or should have known that he was becoming interested in the stock of a "pipe line company, operated for hire."
2. If an occupation, business activity or business activities, in which a Corporation Commissioner participates or with which he is connected, operates as an effective interference  with the discharge of the functions of his office, he shall be deemed to be "engaged in an occupation or business inconsistent with his duties as such commissioner." "Effective interference" as above employed, means any interest in any occupation, business activity or business activities, which is affected in a meaningful manner by the Corporation Commission's exercise of its jurisdiction.

¶35 Neither the promulgation of this opinion on this date nor anything contained herein shall be deemed to invalidate any official act of Freeman performed as a Commissioner prior to the effective date of this opinion as above set forth. See State ex rel. Rucker v. Tapp, Okl., 380 P.2d 260; and Rule 40 of the Rules of the Supreme Court (Title 12 O.S. 1961, Chapter 15).

¶0 Action was commended by G.B. and Billye Mansell [not parties to this appeal] against Pierce alone. Simultaneously with filing his answer Pierce cross-actioned against Horath who them became a new defendant as to the cross-action only. Horath answered to Pierce's cross-action and cross-petitioned against Pierce. Though he did not cause Pierce to be served with summons Horath's attorney served notice on Pierce's attorneys pursuant to 12 O.S. 1961, Ch. 2, App., Rule 1. At pretrial, after the statute of limitations had run and after Pierce had dismissed his cross-action against Horath, the court dismissed Horath for failure to serve summons on Pierce. Reversed with directions.

"Antecedent legislative enactments, which have been repealed or superseded, may be resorted to and considered in the construction of amendatory acts in pari materia. Searcy v. State, 64 Okl. 257, 167 P. 476, 478; State ex rel. Rucker v. Tapp, Okl., 380 P.2d 260, 265; and Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd ed., Vol. 3, Sec. 5805, p. 81.", and further at pp. 800 and 801:

¶0 Former employee of City of Tulsa sought to receive credit for prior military service towards his retirement benefits pursuant to 72 O.S.1991, § 67.13a. Defendants contended that the provision did not apply to the City's retirement plan for its employees. District Court ruled in favor of employee [953 P.2d 331] and certified its interlocutory order from which defendants seek review.

¶9 It is axiomatic that legislative intent is to be first sought in the language of the statute and when that intent is plainly expressed so that the meaning of the statute is clear and the statute is uncontrolled by other parts of the statute or other statutes upon the same subject, there is no room for judicial construction and the statute must be followed without further inquiry. Cave Springs Public School Dist. I-30, of Adair County v. Blair, 613 P2d 1046 (Okl.1980). However, where adherence is urged to the "strict letter" of a statute and the literal interpretation would lead to an inconsistency or incongruity between different parts of the enactment as they bear on each other and would produce consequences clearly beyond legislative contemplation, judicial interpretation becomes necessary to avoid such incongruity and to ascertain the true meaning of the particular words in accord with the legislative intent. State ex rel. Rucker v. Tapp, 380 P.2d 260 Okl. 1963). The goal of the court is always to construe apparently conflicting legislative enactments dealing with the same subject together as a harmonious whole so as to give effect to each provision. Abbott v. Board of Trustees of Oscar Rose, Etc., 586 P.2d 1098 (Okl. 1978). To accomplish this goal it is proper to consider the history and consistent purpose of the legislation on the subject and to discover the policy of the Legislature as disclosed by the course of the legislation. State, ex rel., Rucker, supra.

¶0 The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma certified the following question pursuant to the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, 20 O.S. Supp. 1997 §1601 et seq.
Does 47 O.S. 1991 §12-420 prohibit the admissibility of evidence of the "use or nonuse of a seat belt . . . in any civil suit in Oklahoma" for a manufacturers' products liability claim based on a defective seatbelt restraint system?
The question is answered as follows: 47 O.S. 1991 §12-420 prevents a person from being penalized in a civil proceeding for choosing not to wear a seat belt. However, it does not prohibit the introduction of evidence of the use or nonuse of seat belts in a manufacturers' liability action for a defective seat belt restraint system.

³⁰The plain meaning of statutory language is conclusive except in the rare case in which literal construction will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intention of the Legislature. City of Tulsa v. State ex. rel. Public Employee Relations Bd., 1998 OK 92, ¶14, 967 P.2d 1214; ABC Rentals of San Antonio, Inc. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 142 F.3d 1200, 1206 (10^th Cir. 1998). Where adherence is urged to the "strict letter" of a statute and the literal interpretation would lead to an inconsistency or incongruity between different parts of the enactment as they bear on each other and would produce consequences clearly beyond legislative contemplation, judicial interpretation becomes necessary to avoid such incongruity and to ascertain the true meaning of the particular words in accord with the legislative intent. McNeill v. City of Tulsa, 1998 OK 2, ¶9, 953 P.2d 329; State ex rel. Rucker v. Tapp, 1963 OK 37, ¶12, 380 P.2d 260; See also, Moser v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 1986 OK 78, ¶6, 731 P.2d 406; Bell v. United Farm Agency, Inc., 1956 OK 149, ¶13, 296 P.2d 149; Welch v. Simmons, 1942 OK 89, ¶16, 126 P.2d 89; Keck v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 1940 OK 352, ¶__, 108 P.2d 162. The subject matter and purpose of a statute are material to ascertaining the meaning of a word or phrase used and that language should be construed to be harmonious with the purpose of the act, rather than in a way which would defeat it. McNeill v. City of Tulsa, supra; Simpson v. Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd. 1965 OK 206, ¶18, 409 P.2d 364.

¶0 The petitioner, Bennie Cox (Cox), was appointed By Governor David Walters to a seven-year term as a member of the Oklahoma Mining Commission (Commission) expiring on January 1, 2002. Taking the position that Cox's appointment was for a two-year period pursuant to 45 O.S.Supp. 1995 § 1 , Governor Frank Keating informed Cox that his term expired January 1, 1995. Governor Keating appointed the respondent, Ralph Dawson (Dawson), to Cox's former position on the Commission. Cox filed an original action seeking a writ in the nature of quo warranto to determine which party is lawfully entitled to the position on the Commission. We find that pursuant to 45 O.S.Supp. 1995 § 1 , appointments made subsequent to October 1, 1986, to the Oklahoma Mining Commission were intended to be for seven-year terms. We assume original jurisdiction and settle title to the office in Bennie Cox.

¹² In at least one case this court treated the occupant of a non-existent judicial office as a de facto judge. State ex rel. Rucker v. Tapp, Okl., 380 P.2d 260, 268 (1963).

¶0 The appellee, Regents for Oklahoma State University brought an eminent domain proceeding to take the real property of the appellant, McCloskey Brothers, Inc. The landowner challenged the taking by arguing that the Regents were unconstitutionally formed. The trial court, the Honorable Donald Worthington, determined that the landowner lacked standing to raise such an argument and the court confirmed the report of the commissioners. The landowner appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. We hold that: 1) the landowner's failure to appeal an interlocutory order regarding standing was not preclusive insofar as being raised as an issue in this appeal; 2) although the landowner has standing to challenge the taking generally, such standing does not include the right to collaterally attack the qualifications of the Regents; and even if it did, the Regents' actions were valid as de facto Regents; 3) the taking was for a valid public purpose; and 4) the Regents negotiated in good faith.

⁴⁸ The Town of Luther v. State ex rel. Harrod, 1967 OK 59, ¶30, 425 P.2d 986; Jones v. City of Oklahoma City, 1952 OK 354, ¶6, 250 P.2d 17; Robison v. Chapman, 1932 OK 507, ¶36, 13 P.2d 173. Shore v. Board of Education of Town of Crescent et al, 1924 OK 222, ¶29, 223 P. 867. See also City of Bethany v. Mason, 1949 OK 190, ¶20, 210 P.2d 353 (challenge to incorporation of city must be brought by state); Thomas v. Dawson, 1941 OK 212, ¶3, 115 P.2d 136 (action challenging members of school board); Fritz v. Westmoreland , 1931 OK 303, ¶2, 299 P. 884 and Sugart v. Thorpe, 1931 OK 23, ¶7, 295 P. 605 (motion to intervene denied because private individuals cannot proceed quo warranto against consolidated school district); State ex rel McFayden v. Holtzclaw, 1931 OK 533, ¶17, 2 P.2d 1022(appeal questioning validity of corporate school district cannot be brought by individual); Partridge v. Shore, 1926 OK 330, ¶8, 246 P. 453 (when county attorney declines to institute action, writ of mandamus cannot be used to compel); Cheek v. Eye, 1923 OK 750, ¶¶2-3, 219 P. 883; Griffin et al v. Thomas, 1922 OK 134, ¶7, 206 P. 604; Chambers v. Walker, 1922 OK 117, ¶3, 206 P. 202; Fowler v. Park, 1920 OK 239, ¶8, 190 P. 668; Earloro v. Howard, 1915 OK 348, ¶5, 149 P. 136. One limited exception to such collateral attack appears to be when the legal existence of the court exercising jurisdiction is challenged. See In re Jackson v. Freeman, 1995 OK 100, 905 P.2d 217, the Court addressed the standing of a plaintiff who challenged his drug conviction by an emergency panel of the Court of Criminal Appeals by seeking a writ of quo warranto, challenging the legality of the existence of the panel. We noted that quo warranto is an action used by an individual to assert a substantive right in a particular office claimed by that individual. The petitioner in our case today cannot maintain quo warranto to challenge the validity of the Emergency Appellate Division of the Court of Criminal Appeals. He has no quo warranto standing sufficient to bring such a proceeding. This did not end the plaintiff's pursuit, instead, we held that because this Court possessed the power to review jurisdictional claims lodged against the Court of Criminal Appeals, we could assume jurisdiction in prohibition. Consequently, we allowed the plaintiff's collateral attack to challenge the panel. A similar result was reached in State ex rel. Rucker v. Tapp, 1963 OK 37, 380 P.2d 260, when the legal existence of a county court was challenged. We noted a marked distinction between an action to determine one's title to an office and a challenge to the legal existence of a court. We held that although there was no legal authority for the court, the acts of the judges, as de facto judges, were valid. See also Robertson v. Brewer, 1945 OK 89, ¶8, 156 P.2d 804.

¶1 Kaylee Martin Smith Lynch (Mother) appeals the trial court's September 10, 2008, order granting Nancy Hatton (Grandmother) visitation with N.B.M. (Child). Mother proposes that the trial court had no jurisdiction or, if it did, it incorrectly applied the law. Based on our review of the facts and applicable law, we affirm.

It is axiomatic that legislative intent is to be first sought in the language of the statute and when that intent is plainly expressed so that the meaning of the statute is clear and the statute is uncontrolled by other parts of the statute or other statutes upon the same subject, there is no room for judicial construction and the statute must be followed without further inquiry. Cave Springs Public School Dist. I-30, of Adair County v. Blair, 613 P.2d 1046 (Okl.1980). However, where adherence is urged to the "strict letter" of a statute and the literal interpretation would lead to an inconsistency or incongruity between different parts of the enactment as they bear on each other and would produce consequences clearly beyond legislative contemplation, judicial interpretation becomes necessary to avoid such incongruity and to ascertain the true meaning of the particular words in accord with the legislative intent. State ex rel. Rucker v. Tapp, 380 P.2d 260 (Okl.1963). The goal of the court is always to construe apparently conflicting legislative enactments dealing with the same subject together as a harmonious whole so as to give effect to each provision. Abbott v. Board of Trustees of Oscar Rose, Etc., 586 P.2d 1098 (Okl.1978). To accomplish this goal it is proper to consider the history and consistent purpose of the legislation on the subject and to discover the policy of the Legislature as disclosed by the course of the legislation. State, ex rel., Rucker, supra.

¶0 Taxpayer gave qui tam notice and demand to the Tulsa Industrial Authority (TIA) and the City of Tulsa. TIA sought a declaratory judgment that its conduct was legal, and Taxpayer sought to intervene. The parties objected, and the Hon. Mary F. Fitzgerald, District Judge, Tulsa County, denied Taxpayer's motion to intervene and he appealed. Appellees claimed that the appeal was moot and sought dismissal of the appeal. The Court of Civil Appeals dismissed Taxpayer's appeal for reason that he did not seek to stay the trial court proceedings during the appeal. Taxpayer petitioned this Court for certiorari to the Court of Civil Appeals. We hold that:(1) The qui tam statutes, 62 O.S. §§ 372 and 373, do not ordinarily apply to a public trust; (2) The trial court correctly denied the motion to intervene on Taxpayer's claim for qui tam relief but incorrectly denied the motion to intervene on Taxpayer's equitable relief claim; and (3) Taxpayer's appeal is not moot.

⁸ A strict construction is equated with using a literal construction or literal meaning of the words in a statute. See, e.g., State ex rel. Rucker v. Tapp, 1963 OK 37, 380 P.2d 260, 264; In re Benson, 1936 OK 704, 62 P.2d 962, 963-964; Hollis v. Adams Gin Co., 1925 OK 867, 241 P. 744, 745; Norris v. Cross, 1909 OK 316, 105 P. 1000, 1005 -1006.

¶1 Appellant, Victoria Scott (Mother), seeks review of the trial court's judgment terminating her parental rights to K.S., K.S., R.S., Jr., and R.S. (Children). Appellee, State of Oklahoma (State), moved for a default termination of Mother's parental rights after she failed to personally appear for a court date that the parties considered a pre-trial conference, at which she was represented by counsel. The record on appeal fails to show that Mother was ever served with the statutorily required notice that her failure to personally appear for the hearing on a motion for termination of parental rights would constitute consent to termination. In addition, the record fails to show Mother had any notice that she was to appear for any matter at all on the date in question. Furthermore, the statutory authority to deem failure to appear to constitute consent to termination is limited specifically to the initial or subsequent hearing on a motion or petition to terminate parental rights, and not to just any hearing in the abstract. We reverse and remand for jury trial because the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights without affording her notice and the opportunity to be heard.

¶17 The words, phrases, and sentences of a statute are to be understood as used in context and not in any abstract sense. State ex rel. Rucker v. Tapp, 1963 OK 37, 380 P.2d 260, 264. The subject matter of §1-4-905 is notice of the hearing to terminate parental rights. The statute specifies the manner of service, the content, and the time for service of the notice of the hearing to terminate parental rights. When this statute uses the word "hearing," whether it says "this hearing," "the hearing," "a subsequent hearing," or just "hearing," it is referring specifically to "a hearing on the petition or motion for termination of parental rights," and not to just any hearing in the abstract. The intrinsic language of the statute establishes the Legislature's intent that a parent is deemed to consent to termination if the parent fails to personally appear for an initial or subsequent hearing on the motion or petition to terminate parental rights after being given the notice specified.

¶0 An Oklahoma worker was killed at Employer's jobsite in Texas. Employer's Insurer paid worker's Widow death benefits provided by Texas workers' compensation law. Widow also recovered damages in a wrongful death tort action in Texas. When Employer's Insurer sought subrogation from Widow's wrongful death damages as allowed by Texas law, Widow filed suit in Oklahoma to prevent subrogation. She sought a declaratory judgment that the rights of Oklahoma workers and their dependents are governed by Oklahoma's Workers' Compensation Act, notwithstanding the worker's injury or death in another state, and any benefits that may be paid under another state's workers' compensation law. In particular, Widow asked the Oklahoma court to enforce the provision in Oklahoma law that forbids subrogation in cases of death benefits. The trial court granted the declaratory relief sought by Widow. On appeal by Employer's Insurer, the Court of Civil Appeals reversed. The Court of Civil Appeals ruled that Widow had to commence a proceeding by filing a claim with Oklahoma's Workers' Compensation Court before Oklahoma could exercise jurisdiction over the benefits due Widow, including enforcement of the anti-subrogation provision in death benefit cases. Because Widow never filed a claim with Oklahoma's Workers' Compensation Court, the Court of Civil Appeals held subrogation was proper. We have previously granted certiorari.

⁴ Matter of Estate of Little Bear, 1995 OK 134, ¶22, 909 P.2d 42; State ex rel. Rucker v. Tapp, 1963 OK 37, ¶11, 380 P.2d 260.

¶0 Petitioners filed this original proceeding to challenge Governor Fallin's recent appointment of Respondent, Justice Patrick Wyrick, to the Oklahoma Supreme Court. Upon consideration, we assume original jurisdiction and dismiss the action with prejudice.

¶2 Prohibition is not available as a corrective remedy to undo a completed act, and is not available to try the title to an office. Sneed v. State ex rel. Dep't of Transp., 1983 OK 69, ¶ 11, 683 P.2d 525, 529; State ex rel. Rucker v. Tapp, 1963 OK 37, ¶ 28, 380 P.2d 260, 267. "[A]n action in the nature of quo warranto will be deemed to constitute the exclusive remedy" to try the title to an office.¹ The law is unequivocally clear that a proper plaintiff in a quo warranto proceeding is the Attorney General, the District Attorney, or a contestant for the office at issue.² A "collateral attack by a private individual is not permitted."³ Absolutely no facts were pled suggesting that either of the Petitioners is entitled to the office of Justice of the Oklahoma Supreme Court. This proceeding is clearly a collateral attack by a private individual and is not permitted.

¹ Tapp, 1963 OK 37, ¶ 28, 380 P.2d 260, 267. Section 1532 of Title 12 allows an action in quo warranto "[w]hen any person shall usurp, intrude into, or unlawfully hold or exercise any public office, or shall claim any franchise within this state or any office in any corporation created by authority of this state." 12 O.S. 2011 § 1532.

¶0 This office has received your request for an official Attorney General Opinion in which you ask, in effect, the following question:

¶11 Finally, the legislative history of Section 3113 also counsels in favor of this conclusion. See State ex rel. Rucker v. Tapp, 1963 OK 37, ¶ 14, 380 P.d 260, 265 ("In determining what meaning should be given" to particular statutory language, "we may properly seek resort to the history of [the statute.]") Prior to 2008, a property owner could redeem his or her property sold at a tax sale by paying to the county treasurer "the sum paid to the county for [the tax sale] certificate and all taxes paid and endorsed thereon." 68 O.S.Supp.2007, § 3113. Under that scheme, the county treasurer was only permitted to transfer the tax certificate for "the full amount due on any parcel of land[.]" Id. § 3108(B) (emphasis added). If, in the course of reworking the tax sale process, the Legislature intended for that requirement to remain, it would have used broader language, such as "full amount due," "all taxes," or "all delinquent taxes." Instead, it chose the narrower language of "the sum which was originally delinquent."

¶0 This office has received your request for an official Attorney General Opinion in which you ask, in effect, the following question:
If a person is eligible for parole as an "aging prisoner" under 57 O.S.Supp.2019, § 332.21, but is serving consecutive sentences imposed for multiple criminal convictions, may the Pardon and Parole Board grant parole for sentence(s) yet to be served?

¶10 This conclusion is further reinforced by reference to the history of House Bill 2286, which created Section 332.21, as it made its way through the legislative process. See State ex rel. Cartwright v. Georgia-Pac. Corp., 1982 OK 148, ¶ 34, 663 P.2d 718, 724 ("[A]ny doubt about the meaning of a statute may be resolved by reference to its history."); State ex rel. Rucker v. Tapp, 1963 OK 37, ¶ 14, 380 P.2d 260, 265 ("In determining what meaning should be given" to particular statutory language, "we may properly seek resort to the history of [the statute.]"). As it was being considered by the Legislature, several iterations of H.B. 2286 included a shorter provision that would have created a parole option for "aging prisoners." See, e.g., H.B. 2286, 56th Legislature, 1st Session, § 7 (House Floor Version). However, in those versions of the bill, the provision was found in a section numbered 332.7b, placing the language directly after the general parole statute. Id. More importantly, like Section 332.7, the proposed provision spoke in terms of prisoner eligibility; it did not grant a new discretionary authority to the Board. Indeed, the provision stated that such prisoners, should they meet the eligibility requirements set forth therein, "shall be eligible for parole pursuant to Section 332.7 of Title 57 of the Oklahoma Statutes[.]" Id.

¶0 Appellants, Bruce Dean Schultz and Jared Bruce mutually seek to vacate their adult adoption granted ten years prior. The trial court opined that because the Oklahoma Adoption Code, 10 O.S. 2011, § 7507-1.1, does not address the vacation of adult adoptions, it lacked authority to grant the vacation sought by both parties. Appellants appealed directly to this Court as a matter of first impression, and we retained the matter.

¹ Where strict application of a statute "would lead to an inconsistency or incongruity between different parts of the enactment as they bear upon each other, and would produce consequences clearly beyond legislative contemplation, judicial interpretation becomes necessary to avoid such incongruity." State ex rel. Rucker v. Tapp, 1963 OK 37, ¶12, 380 P.2d 260, 264. Likewise,