Appeal from the District Court of Oklahoma County; Donald Howard, Judge.

¶0 The District Court of Oklahoma County denied mother's motion to vacate a default judgment terminating her parental rights and mother appealed. The motion to vacate, filed approximately fourteen months after the termination order, was based on lack of notice and failure of service.

AFFIRMED.

Albert Ghezzi, Doug Parr, Barry Benefield, Oklahoma City, for appellant.

Rebecca L. McNeese, Asst. Dist. Atty., Oklahoma City, for appellees.

DOOLIN, Justice:

[656 P.2d 254]

¶1 A petition seeking termination of parental rights of Dana was filed December 10, 1979. Dana had not previously been adjudicated a dependent and neglected child. The alleged grounds for termination were: failure to provide proper parental care, failure to provide support and abandonment.

¶3 Temporary custody was placed in DISRS on the date the petition was filed. An affidavit for service by publication was filed which recited that due diligence had been exercised in attempting to locate the natural parents. Service was directed in a manner authorized by law. An adjudicatory hearing was set for January 7, 1980. Notice of the termination hearing was published December 21, 1979.

¶4 Neither parent appeared at the adjudicatory hearing. No transcript was made of the hearing. The termination order included findings that: (1) service had been had by publication, the whereabouts of the parents being unknown; (2) actual notice had been given to mother by Mrs. V. a few days prior to the hearing and (3) Dana should be declared a deprived child and parental rights terminated.

¶5 Mr. and Mrs. V. subsequently petitioned for adoption. The final decree was entered November 5, 1980.

¶6 On March 3, 1981, nearly fourteen months after the termination hearing, mother filed a motion to vacate the judgments based on lack of personal jurisdiction. Mother alleged that she did not learn of the adjudicatory hearing until several days after it had been held. She further alleged that service by publication was invalid as the state failed to exercise diligence in attempting to locate her. She asserted that she was readily available for personal service as Mr. and Mrs. V. knew of her residence and place of employment at all times prior to the adjudicatory hearing.

¶7 Mother appeals from the denial of this motion. The primary issue presented in this case is whether the method of notification used deprived mother of due process and the court of jurisdiction to terminate her parental rights. Mother also argues that the trial court was without authority to terminate parental rights without first affording her a three month period in which to correct the conditions leading to Dana's adjudication as a deprived child under 10 Okla. Stat. 1981, § 1130(A)(3).

I

¶8 Before jurisdiction may be exercised over a person in a proceeding which may directly and adversely affect a legally protected interest, a method of notification must be used which is reasonably calculated to provide knowledge of the proposed exercise of jurisdiction and an opportunity to be heard. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950); Bomford v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 440 P.2d 713 (Okl. 1968). In Bomford, we recognized that due process is not a rigid doctrine imposing strict notice requirements; rather, the type of notice required will necessarily vary with the circumstances. 440 P.2d at 718.

¶9 Actual notice is the preferred method of satisfying due process requirements, but it has long been recognized that actual notice is not always feasible. As the United States Supreme Court said in Mullane:

Thus, notice by publication is not, per se, a denial of due process. The trial court was without jurisdiction to terminate mother's rights only if notice by publication was inappropriate in this case.

¶10 The procedural due process requirements for termination of parental rights in this state are codified in 10 Okla. Stat. 1981, § 1131 which provides in pertinent part:

¶11 Mother asserts the following deviations from the statutory provisions:

To support her challenges to the validity of service, mother relies primarily on Tammie v. Rodriquez, 570 P.2d 332 (Okl. 1977). In Tammie, we stated:

¶12 In relying on Tammie, mother overlooks several significant factual distinctions. In Tammie, the mother's parental rights were terminated by default after a prior adjudication that her child was deprived. Service was made by publication although the mother's home and business addresses appeared in the record and were known to the court. In fact, personal service had been attempted five times prior to the termination hearing. No notice was mailed to the mother's home and she had no actual notice of the hearing until several days after her parental rights were terminated.

¶13 The major difference between Tammie and the instant case is that there the trial court had the mother's address in its own records and her whereabouts were known. In the absence of a complete record (here, the failure to make a record of the termination hearing), the findings of fact and law by the trial court are presumed to be true. Board of Commissioners of D. County v. Wright, 8 Okl. 190, 57 P. 203 (1899). We must, therefore, accept that mother received actual notice a few days before the hearing, as found by the trial court.

¶15 In considering mother's attack on the trial court's jurisdiction, then, we are limited to an examination of the record. Every jurisdictional fact not negatived on the face of the record must be presumed to be true. Bomford v. Socony Oil Co., 440 P.2d 713 (Okl. 1968); Yahola Oil Co. v. Causey, 181 Okl. 129, 72 P.2d 817 (1937).

¶17 The mandates of Section 1131 and Bomford have clearly been met. The "pertinent facts" of Bomford were before the Court when the order for publications notice was rendered. Supporting documents advised the Court that the parents' whereabouts were unknown, that the Mother had left the child with the Appellees since birth and that the Mother had no known address.

¶18 While Mother complains that the finding of "due diligence" was conclusionary, her argument is in itself "conclusionary." She states her address was known to the parties, period. She makes no attempt to produce facts which might lead one to that conclusion.

¶19 Where, as here, the journal entry and termination order recite that the party's whereabouts are unknown and have approved the service given, such recital is to be treated as an effective adjudication of compliance with the publication provision. Cf. Bomford v. Socony Oil Co., supra; Barton v. Alpine Investments, Inc., 596 P.2d 532 (Okl. 1979) cert. denied 444 U.S. 1031, 100 S.Ct. 701, 62 L.Ed.2d 667.

¶20 In this case the requirement of a specific finding, supported by appropriate facts, that the parents' whereabouts was unknown and that due diligence has been exercised in trying to locate them, was complied with. See Bomford, supra. We strongly urge trial courts to include such recitals in journal entries of default judgments, particularly when parental rights have been terminated by default.

¶21 Finally, jurisdiction of the trial court is not defeated by the failure to mail notice of the termination hearing to mother's last known address. 10 Okla. Stat. 1981, § 1131 provides that the court may allow service by publication and mailing of notice to the last known address. In Tammie such mailing was required because the mother's address was known to the court. In this case, no address for mother, past or present, appeared in the record. The law does not require useless or impossible acts.

II

¶24 We find no fundamental error.

¶25 AFFIRMED.

¶26 IRWIN, C.J., BARNES, V.C.J., and HODGES, LAVENDER, SIMMS, HARGRAVE and WILSON, JJ., concur.

¶27 OPALA, J., dissents.