Office of Governor Brad Henry
State of Oklahoma
State Capitol - Oklahoma City OK 73105
405-521-2342

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE - April 25, 2008

Gov. Henry Appoints Deborah Barnes
to Civil Appeals Court

(Oklahoma City) Governor Brad Henry announced today the appointment of Deborah Ann Browers Barnes of Tulsa to the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals. She will fill the position previously held by Justice John Reif, whom Gov. Henry appointed to the Oklahoma Supreme Court in October.

Barnes earned her law degree from the Oklahoma City University School of Law in 1983. She served as a staff attorney for Justice Ralph Hodges at the Oklahoma Supreme Court from 1985 to 1989, and since then has worked in civil litigation, administrative law, commercial and business law.

Deborah Barnes worked as vice president, corporate secretary and associate general counsel at ONEOK, Inc. in Tulsa from 1997 to 2001. Most recently, she worked in private practice at Crutchmer, Browers & Barnes, P.L.L.C from 2002 to the present.

"I want to thank Debbie Barnes for her willingness to serve the state of Oklahoma," Gov. Henry said. "Her breadth of experience makes her a great fit for the Court of Civil Appeals, and I know she will serve the court with honor and integrity."

Gov. Henry selected Barnes from a recommendation list compiled by the Oklahoma Judicial Nominating Commission.

The Oklahoma Supreme Court MIS Department at the Administrative Office of the Courts has the following positions available.

• Business Analyst
• Developer
• Systems Administrator
• Network Administrator
• Systems Technician

For a detailed description of job qualifications and responsibilities, please visit our Employment Opportunities section of OSCN. Qualified candidates may send their resumes via e-mail to opportunities@oscn.net or via fax to (405) 521-9688. Please designate the job title of the position you are applying for in the subject line of your e-mail or fax cover sheet.

The State of Oklahoma is an Equal Opportunity Employer.

TRIAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR
JUDICIAL DISTRICT 14

General summary: The trial court administrator is appointed by and serves at the pleasure of the district and associate district judges of Tulsa and Pawnee Counties. The duties of the court administrator are to assist the presiding judge of the judicial district in the performance of his administrative duties. Under the general direction of the presiding judge with collaboration from judges, the state Administrative Office of the Courts and county departments, this position performs administrative duties including personnel management, budgeting, purchasing, fiscal control, interpreter services and jury management.

Qualifications: To be eligible for appointment, an applicant shall possess at least one of the following minimum qualifications:

• Be an attorney licensed to practice law in this state;
• Have a bachelor�s degree in court management, or an equivalent degree; or
• Have at least ten (10) years� experience in management with substantial supervisory responsibility; and
• Be a graduate of the Institute for Court Management.

Salary: Equivalent to that of a Special Judge, currently $100,500.

Submit an original and 4 copies of your resume to: Court Administrator�s Office, Tulsa County Courthouse, Room 637, 500 S. Denver, Tulsa, OK 74103 or send one copy of your resume electronically to ann.domin@oscn.net. Resumes must be received by 5:00 p.m. on May 16, 2008. The State of Oklahoma is an equal opportunity employer.

SCOTT v. ARCHON GROUP, L.P., 102782, 2008 OK 45, ___ P.3d ___, Decided 05/06/2008

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�0 Certiorari was previously granted to review a Court of Appeals decision reversing the trial court's award of summary judgment to defendants in a premises liability action where plaintiffs sought recovery of damages from defendants for injuries suffered when a clearance beam at the entrance into the upper parking deck of the office building where plaintiff Robert Scott, Jr., worked fell on his truck after the truck struck the beam. Plaintiffs sued the building's owner, previous owners, interest holders and property management group and employee. The Honorable Vicki L. Robertson, trial judge, granted summary judgment to all defendants and plaintiffs appealed. We hold summary judgment was properly granted, reverse the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals and affirm the trial court.

CIMMARRON TRANSPORTATION, LLC v. HEAVNER, 103197, 2008 OK 44, ___ P.3d ___, Decided 05/06/2008

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�0 In an appeal from a ruling of the Cleveland County Board of Equalization, the district court of Cleveland County, Honorable William C. Hetherington, Jr., upheld the valuation for ad valorem taxes made by the Cleveland County assessor of inactive pipeline purchased by the appellant in 2002. Because the trial court failed to apply the proper standard of review by determining both facts and law de novo, as provided by statute, the cause must be reversed and remanded.

GARNETT v. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, 103332, 2008 OK 43, ___ P.3d ___, Decided 05/06/2008

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�0 On August 20, 2002, Brady Fain's (Fain) car struck Douglas Hargrove's (the driver) pickup, in which Charles Garnett (the passenger) was a passenger. Government Employees Insurance Company (the insurer) insured both Fain and the driver. The passenger brought suit for payment under the driver's underinsured motorist policy. At the first trial, the insurer's counsel made inflammatory remarks about the passenger's expert medical witness, and the trial court declared a mistrial. The passenger moved for sanctions, and in his motion, disclosed a settlement offer made by the insurer during mediation. The insurer then moved for sanctions against the passenger. The trial court sanctioned the insurer and the passenger's counsel. At the second trial, the jury found for the passenger. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. We granted certiorari to address the first impression issue of whether a trial court may sanction a party or attorney for a disclosure of communications made during mediation. We find that, under the facts of this cause, the trial court erred by sanctioning the passenger's counsel. We also find that the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment on the issue of bad faith or by denying the insurer's motion for new trial.